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REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EVACUATION

with a covering memorandum by the Secretary
of State for the Home Department

*Presented by the Secretary of State for the Home Department
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty
July 1938*

LONDON

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
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
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MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, COVERING THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EVACUATION.

1. In presenting to Parliament the Report of the Committee on Evacuation it is desirable that some indication should be given of the policy of His Majesty's Government on the main conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.

2. His Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to the employment of air forces in attacks directed against the civil population. They have in the past indicated their abhorrence of such a course and their intention to take all practicable steps to secure international agreement which would reduce the risk from air warfare to the civil population. As long, however, as there is a risk that the civilian population will be bombed, the Government consider that arrangements must be made on the general lines proposed by the Committee.

3. The Government have accepted the principles of the recommendations made by the Committee and action has already been taken, both in the light of the recommendations in this report and of the experience gained during the recent emergency, to examine and prepare in detail evacuation schemes.

4. In approving the recommendations of the Committee the Government in particular express their concurrence in the following principles:—

(a) That, except in so far as it may be necessary for military or other special reasons to require persons to leave some limited area, evacuation should not be compulsory.

(b) That, for the purpose of supporting the national war effort and supplying essential civilian needs, production in the large industrial towns must be maintained, but it is desirable to provide organised facilities for the evacuation of substantial numbers of people from certain industrial areas.

(c) That arrangements for the reception of persons who become refugees should be mainly on the basis of accommodation in private houses under powers of compulsory billeting. These arrangements will require very detailed preparation in order to avoid unnecessary hardship either to the refugees or to the persons who receive them.

(d) That the initial cost of evacuation arrangements should be borne by the Government but that refugees who can afford to contribute towards the cost of their maintenance should be expected to do so.

(e) That, to meet the needs of parents who wish to send their children away but cannot make their own arrangements, special arrangements should be made for school children to move out in groups from their schools in charge of their teachers.

SAMUEL HOARE.

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NOTE.—With the concurrence of the Committee certain confidential details have, in the national interest, been omitted from the published Report.

The expenses incurred by the Committee amounted to £125 10s. od., of which £121 10s. od. represents the estimated cost of printing and publishing this Report.

COMMITTEE ON EVACUATION

REPORT

To Lieutenant-Colonel The Right Honourable SIR SAMUEL HOARE, Bt., G.C.S.I., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department.

SIR,

We were appointed by you on the 24th May, 1938, and the scope of our task was indicated in your answer to a question in the House of Commons on the 26th May, as follows:—

“ Various aspects of the problem of transferring persons from areas which are likely to be exposed to continuous air attack, including the plans said to be in contemplation in other countries, have been examined by the Home Office. With the purpose of bringing the subject under full review, I have invited the Right Hon. Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir John Anderson) and the Hon. Members for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir Percy Harris), Balham and Tooting (Lieutenant-Colonel George Doland) and North Islington (Dr. Haden Guest) to serve on a Committee which will assist me in the preparation of plans. While this Committee will, no doubt, begin its work on the problem of London, it will have in mind the application of its plans to other big centres of population ”.

2. We have held 25 meetings and examined 57 witnesses. A list of these witnesses and of the organised bodies which have sent witnesses or submitted written representations is given in Appendix A.

3. We have completed a review of the problem in all its aspects and consider that we are now in a position to report upon the general principles on which detailed plans for evacuation should be based. The task appears to us to be one of great urgency. The preparation of plans will clearly involve a mass of work, to be undertaken by a great many authorities and voluntary organisations. The completion of such plans in detail need not take long, but it would be unreasonable and might involve much waste of effort if that stage in the work were entered upon before matters of policy which His Majesty's Government alone can decide were determined.

4. In the time at our disposal it has not been possible to give detailed consideration to the special aspects which the problem may present in particular industrial areas. We have, therefore, given special attention to the question of evacuation in relation to London which presents special difficulties because of its size and the density of population in certain areas. We believe that the course to be followed in working out plans for London will prove to be readily adaptable to other places where schemes of evacuation should be prepared.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL SURVEY.

Introduction.

5. We propose first to indicate the nature and proportions of the problem as we see it; and to present certain general conclusions at which we have arrived.

6. In any future war in which Great Britain is at conflict with a great European power, air invasion would take place on a very much greater scale than the air raids on London and other cities during the war of 1914-18. Large numbers of planes would be directed against docks, public utility undertakings, important factories and recognised military objectives.

7. Whether or not the civilian population were deliberately attacked, people living in industrial areas would be exposed to great dangers, especially those living in the immediate neighbourhood of important targets. Inner London contains many such objectives of attack and is, therefore, particularly vulnerable; and in different degrees the same is true of various other industrial areas. Other places, for example the naval ports, might be exposed to special risks because of the existence of military objectives in the neighbourhood.

8. Practical considerations, such as the number of aeroplanes available and the distance of possible objectives, are likely to restrict the number of places chosen for attack. Vast tracts of the country cannot be attacked simultaneously, and important places in the central and eastern parts of Great Britain are likely to bear the brunt of the first attacks.

9. But if we turn from London and the industrial areas to the counties, with their small towns, villages, and rural areas, the likelihood of attack becomes very much less and the degree of safety correspondingly greater. No part of the country is likely in the future to be safe from attack in the sense that it will be out of range, but in many places the risk will not be substantially greater than that bombs might be dropped in error or to relieve an aeroplane of its cargo when it had missed its objective.

10. Even in the industrial areas, there are great differences as between one part of the area and another. Some parts may be highly dangerous, others much less dangerous and some perhaps hardly dangerous at all.

Voluntary Exodus.

11. Whatever the Government's plans, it is to be anticipated that there would be an exodus, on a scale which cannot accurately be foreseen, from any area which had been subjected to repeated air attack. Men and women engaged on work of an essential character would in the great majority of cases be moved by a sense of public duty to remain at their tasks, and the Government of the day may be expected to exhort them to do so, as their contribution to the national effort. The tendency to migrate would accordingly be found more especially among those whose presence could be spared. We have assumed that the Government would not normally attempt forcibly to restrain persons from leaving a vulnerable area. If large numbers of persons are determined to leave a district, it does not seem to be practicable, even if it were desirable, to prevent them from doing so.

12. We have also assumed that as a general rule compulsion would not be exercised to require persons to leave a vulnerable area if they desired to stay. Limited areas might have to be completely evacuated for military reasons or on such grounds as the risk of flooding, but apart from these special cases we do not believe that public opinion would accept any scheme for the compulsory transfer from their homes of vast numbers of town dwellers.

13. Without attempting to resort to methods of compulsion, the Government could, however, exercise a substantial measure of control over any movement of population. In the first place, if it has taken steps in advance to secure the necessary data, it can advise who should go and who should stay. We believe that the public spirit of the people of this country is such that in a time of grave national emergency they would be entirely responsive to guidance of this kind from the Government. If the advice were given in clear and precise terms, it would have a powerful effect in securing an ordered evacuation. A second respect in which the Government can influence any movement of the population is by the use made of the organised facilities at its disposal. Panic will be allayed if it is known that the Government has worked out plans and is ready to put them into operation; and the character of any large-scale exodus from the towns will be moulded by the arrangements made for employing the available transport and other facilities.

14. Accordingly, in the examination we have made of the case for and against evacuation, we have had in mind, not any attempt to regiment the population, but the direction in which the influence of the Government and the resources at its disposal should be employed.

Need for Active and Passive Defence.

15. A very high proportion of the essential activities of the country is carried on in areas which might be exposed to severe aerial bombardment. This is notably the case in London. The vital place of the Capital in finance, commerce and government needs no elaboration. As regards industry, Greater London contains one in five of the insured workers of this country, and we were informed by the Ministry of Labour that 62 per cent. of the London workers are engaged in industry groups which would be particularly important in war-time for production, commerce and government.

16. The cessation in time of war of industrial and other essential activities in London and the main centres of population would cripple the nation's war efforts and paralyse the life of the community by the failure to supply essential civilian needs. For these reasons the evacuation of the entire population from the larger towns, even if practicable, would be a disastrous step, not to be contemplated for a moment.

17. Plans for evacuation are accordingly no substitute for measures of active and passive defence designed to enable production to be maintained in the large industrial towns throughout the country. The recommendations we make do not in any way detract from the urgent need for adequate active defences in the air and on the ground, and for proper shelter accommodation and other measures of air raid precautions to protect and succour those who will be expected to continue to live and work in vulnerable areas.

Scope of Transference.

18. It is, nevertheless, clear that a proportion of the population of industrial areas could be transferred from them without serious detriment to national efficiency.

19. At our request, the Ministry of Labour made a general survey of the situation in London. Clearly children under 14 years of age and unoccupied and retired persons could go. A percentage of the employed population, composed of varying proportions in the different industries, could also be spared; and while many housewives would remain to provide for the needs of the working population, a considerable proportion of the women in London need not stay.

It is difficult to estimate the proportion of the total population of London which could be evacuated without serious loss to essential activities. The Ministry of Labour thought the proportion might be as high as a half; but they admitted that this estimate was very speculative. In the absence of a detailed

investigation, we should prefer not to commit ourselves to any definite figure, beyond saying that it would be substantial and would represent a very large number of persons in the aggregate.

20. Substantial proportions of the population could be spared from other industrial areas, though the numbers would of course vary according to the extent to which essential industries were centred in an area.

21. In the case of finance and commerce rather different considerations enter. We have been informed that plans are under consideration by the interests concerned for the removal from London in time of war of essential financial and commercial activities, where a transfer to safer areas is practicable. This matter is not within our reference, but is obviously of great importance, and will affect the numbers of people who should be evacuated, as also will any decentralisation of Governmental activities and the calls likely to be made on the civilian population for war service of various kinds.

22. As a rough working hypothesis we have taken one-third as the proportion of the population for whose evacuation from vulnerable areas provision might ultimately be required.

23. At this point we should explain that when we use the term "evacuation" we mean transference beyond the limits of the urban area concerned. We employ the term "dispersal" to denote redistribution within the same urban area.

Difficulties of Evacuation.

24. The transference of large numbers of people from their homes and accustomed surroundings to other and often unfamiliar areas is not a task to be undertaken lightly. It raises problems of great complexity and difficulty at every stage, whether it be the collection and transportation of the refugees or their reception, accommodation and feeding at the other end. All the services which are delicately adjusted to meet the needs of the community on the present distribution of the population would have to be refashioned to deal with the new situation. Both in the areas from which persons are drawn and in the country districts to which they are taken, social problems and questions of public order of great complexity would be bound to arise. In time of peace such movement of the population would present difficulties of great magnitude. In war, there will be the added complications that the transfer will coincide with the dislocation inseparable from the transition from peace to war, and that it may have to be carried out after hostile air attack has begun and under conditions of considerable disorganisation.

Arguments for Evacuation.

25. In spite of these difficulties we are convinced that the contingency is one against which the fullest possible provision must be made. It is a matter on which the whole issue of any future war may well turn. So far as concerns actual physical danger, people will be much safer in rural districts or in small country towns than in the heart of London. Even if a country district is bombed, the risks to life and limb will obviously be much less in a rural district where the houses are so dispersed that the density of population is 200 to the square mile, than in a metropolitan borough where the density is 80,000 to the square mile. A thinning of the population of congested urban areas will automatically reduce the number of casualties in the event of raids. It will also relieve the pressure on the essential services (including air raid precautions) in these areas. Unless enormous numbers were enrolled and vast stocks of equipment bought it is doubtful whether these services would ever be adequate to deal with the situation which might be created in, say, the East End of London if it were continuously bombed and retained its full peace-time population. Nor might it be possible in the dislocation which would ensue to feed the population or supply the various essential services.

26. Apart from the danger to life and limb, there are obviously strong objections on humanitarian grounds to the retention, in areas which are likely to be the object of deliberate attack, of persons whose presence is not absolutely essential. It is impossible fully to envisage the horrors of intensive air attack by the forces of a major European power on a densely populated city; but events in Spain and China have at least given some indication of what might befall. No one would willingly expose children, the aged or infirm, or anyone whose presence could be dispensed with to the nervous strain entailed.

27. There is another vitally important consideration. If the public know in advance that adequate plans of evacuation are ready to be put into force wherever circumstances require, the risk of large uncontrolled movements, resulting in widespread loss of morale and lowering of war efficiency, will be reduced to a minimum.

28. It must remain a matter for conjecture whether air raids will be concentrated on certain specific targets. If they are so directed, it may be necessary to arrange a compulsory evacuation of any residential area in the immediate vicinity. Workers housed in that area would have to be accommodated at a reasonable distance from their place of work, and if adequate shelters were provided it might be practicable after a period for them to return to their homes, or to other accommodation specially prepared at or near their place of work.

29. On a careful review of the considerations set out above, we have reached the conclusion that this country will not be fully prepared for attack from a hostile power with a strong air force until schemes of evacuation covering the main industrial centres in the country have been worked out and the necessary organisation has been set up to enable such schemes to be brought speedily into operation in time of emergency.

Form of Plans for Evacuation.

30. The ideal scheme would be one under which the Government would be in a position to determine with some degree of precision either in advance or on the occurrence of the emergency, which individuals should remain where they are and who should be exhorted to leave. Such a scheme, however, would seem to presuppose the existence of a plan to enable the authorities to assign to each individual his rôle in time of war. To discuss the full implications of such a plan would carry us far beyond our reference. We must content ourselves with pointing out that any effective step in this direction—for example, the compilation of a national register—would be likely to contribute to the smooth and efficient working of any plan of evacuation.

31. There are certain steps, however, independent of any elaborate organisation of national service, which can, and in our opinion should, be taken at once. These steps, which we discuss in detail in a later chapter, comprise the organisation of transport services from industrial areas, the elaboration of plans for the reception of refugees in relatively safe areas and provision for their housing, feeding, and general welfare.

32. We have indicated above that, except possibly in certain limited areas of high risk, we consider that evacuation should be on a voluntary basis. A proportion of the population will wish to go by their own transport to destinations of their own selection in the country. We see no reason why this movement should be restrained in any way, though it will require a great deal of careful organisation as a road traffic problem. We understand that in London the Commissioner of Police has already had this matter under consideration, in consultation with the London Passenger Transport Board.

33. As regards those who may wish to avail themselves of the facilities afforded by the Government, it will be difficult to obtain any precise information in advance of the event, except in special cases such as school children with which we deal in detail later. Even as regards probable numbers, it may not prove to be practicable to do more than make tentative inquiries to form an estimate of the proportion of the population who would wish to go. It has also to be borne in mind that when war comes, intentions formed in peace may be drastically modified.

34. A further factor of uncertainty in the preparation of plans, to which many of those with whom we discussed those problems drew attention, is the timing of evacuation. If evacuation can be carried out before there are air attacks, the process will be far more speedy and far less difficult than if it is delayed until war has begun. It was, however, impressed upon us that any Government would be loath to put into force plans for evacuation until it was persuaded that all hopes of maintaining peace had gone and that there might well be little or no margin of time between that stage and the outbreak of hostilities. We recognise the force of these observations; and we believe that if there is war the probability is that it will have broken out before any large-scale scheme of evacuation has been put into full operation. Accordingly any plans which are prepared must be capable of execution under conditions of air attack, though no doubt at a slower rate than would be possible at an earlier stage. At the same time we would stress the importance of bringing the plans into operation at the earliest practicable moment, at all events so far as the school children are concerned.

35. Until a complete survey of available accommodation in the safer areas has been made, it will be impossible to determine the scale on which evacuation can be carried out without overtaxing the resources of the country. We believe that accommodation will in fact prove to be the limiting factor, in the sense that there will not be room in the relatively safe areas for all who could theoretically be spared from the vulnerable industrial areas. Our enquiries, however, justify the expectation that, except in Scotland, the limit will be found to be well in excess of the proportion of one-third, which, as indicated in paragraph 22, we have taken as a working hypothesis on which to base the numbers to be catered for.

36. The plans to be drawn up should be on broad lines, designed to make the fullest practicable use of the facilities available. Within the limits of the plan, evacuation can then be carried out in time of emergency to whatever extent is decided upon by the authorities when war comes or is imminent.

37. It would be difficult to determine in advance the exact pace at which, within the limits of available facilities, evacuation is carried out. So far as the wishes of individuals are concerned, the efflux of refugees would probably be in waves and some allowance for this tendency, the exact extent of which cannot be foreseen, would have to be made in any scheme.

It would also be useful to classify areas within a vulnerable zone in the order of priority in which organised evacuation should take place from them. Facilities might be provided at the outset of hostilities for some of these areas to be thinned of

their population, while the execution of plans in respect of others might be delayed until the nature and extent of the air attack directed against this country was known.

In any event the initial stages would be bound to be difficult and we believe that some curtailment of the movement of persons into vulnerable areas—such as might be achieved by the declaration of Bank Holidays in the first days of the war—would be of great value and would assist the outward movement of refugees.

38. The results of our examination of the transport, reception, accommodation, feeding and welfare aspects of the evacuation problem, more particularly in their application to London, are outlined in the chapters which follow; and the recommendations which we make above are based on these detailed investigations.

CHAPTER II.

DETAILED ASPECTS.

Transport Facilities.

39. We discussed with representatives of the main line railway companies and of the London Passenger Transport Board the facilities which would be available for transporting persons from London to places of greater safety. As a rough basis on which to work, we suggested to the railway companies that they should assume that refugees in the first instance would be taken on an average 50 miles from the centre of London.

40. It is clear that an exodus on the scale which is contemplated should be based primarily upon the railway system which has a carrying capacity far beyond that of motor road transport.

41. The general character of the arrangements proposed by the companies was that road transport and the underground railways should be used to feed the main line railways at selected entraining centres. It was thought to be undesirable to make the transfer from the underground railways to the main lines in vulnerable areas, especially where the London Passenger Transport Board tube system is still in tunnel. The companies proposed that transfer from the London Passenger Transport Board system to the main lines should be at certain places on the outskirts of London. In a few cases the Board's station is at some distance from the main line railway station, and it would be desirable to provide a certain number of buses to facilitate the exchange, especially in the case of the young, the infirm and the aged.

42. It would probably be desirable to use a considerable proportion of the L.P.T.B. omnibuses on skeleton services in Central London, which would assist in taking members of the public from their homes to underground railway stations. There are also a number of districts which are not served by tube or district railways where bus services would have to serve as feeders to the main line railway stations.

43. It was also proposed that in the case of one or two main line stations situated in congested areas, collection should be direct to these stations.

44. Under a scheme on the lines indicated above, the main line railway companies and the London Passenger Transport Board have calculated that, with their combined resources, they could remove 100,000 persons per hour from London. The London Passenger Transport Board would probably have some

surplus capacity over this figure; and, if desired, this excess capacity could be used to take refugees to areas on the fringe of London.

45. The figure of 100,000 persons per hour would fully occupy the sections of the line over which the trains would run and would leave no surplus capacity for any suburban or main line services and would exclude goods traffic entirely, including the transport of highly perishable goods. In the event of these services having to be provided in some measure, while evacuation was being effected, the rate of removal of persons from London would be slowed down, but presumably not to any substantial extent.

46. The main line railway companies have informed us that the question whether trains were to be operated on a shuttle service to a few relatively large detraining centres, or to a number of stations along each line whereby the refugees would be distributed more nearly to their ultimate destinations, would be a matter of arrangement which would not substantially affect their carrying capacity.

47. The figures supplied to us by the companies assume that seats in railway carriages would have to be found for all. This is in order to provide for the minimum of luggage which refugees would have to be allowed to bring with them.

48. We recommend that, when the outline of a scheme for an area has been drawn up, the railway companies and other transport agencies concerned should be given the general plan and asked to prepare emergency time tables for the transport services required, which would be held in readiness for immediate operation if the need arose.

Reception Arrangements.

49. We have not considered in detail the arrangements to be made for the reception of refugees at the detraining points, but we have had various consultations on the general character of the plans which will be required.

50. We believe that, in a very large-scale evacuation from London, it would prove to be more convenient to take refugees to relatively large centres, and to organise the necessary arrangements from these places for the distribution of refugees in the surrounding districts.

To meet the contingency of possible delay in the transference of refugees to their allotted accommodation, it will be desirable to provide for the temporary reception of as many persons as possible in empty houses, halls and other large buildings, and to make arrangements for their feeding. These are details which must be worked out on the spot, according to the circumstances of each locality.

51. The use of camps could not be contemplated as a general rule but there might be cases where the inadequacy of accommodation of a permanent character would necessitate the provision in advance of temporary hutments at detraining centres.

52. We are satisfied that it would be quite practicable to organise in the various country districts the necessary arrangements for distributing the refugees from the main line stations to the towns and villages for which they were ultimately destined. This would be a matter of detailed arrangement to be made locally, in which all available transport facilities would be pressed into service. In some cases where the distances were relatively short it would not be unreasonable to ask the refugees to walk the remaining distance, provided that they were given clear directions on the subject.

Accommodation.

53. Accommodation for large numbers of refugees can only be obtained quickly and economically by billeting in private houses, and we have consulted the Ministry of Health and the Department of Health for Scotland on the accommodation which would be available if a proportion of the population of the more densely populated parts of the country were evacuated to relatively safe areas.

54. The numbers that could be placed in private houses depend on the extent to which it is practicable, having regard to convenience and considerations of decency, to crowd persons into available accommodation. Broadly speaking, there are two recognised standards for peace-time conditions. By the Housing Act, 1935, and the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1935, a statutory minimum standard was laid down, non-compliance with which renders the offender liable to penalties. The Ministry of Health have assumed, as a rough basis of calculation for our present purposes, that five persons might be accommodated in every four rooms. In the South of England this would be equivalent to doubling the present population.

55. In building new houses for slum clearance and in calculating the exchequer subsidy thereon, Parliament has laid down a standard on a quite different basis, which may be regarded as a good standard of occupation for working class houses. This provides roughly that a non-parlour house with three bedrooms should accommodate not more than five persons, or one person per room.

56. The tables set out in Appendix B to this report show the accommodation available in the various counties in England and Wales and in Scotland on the standards indicated in paragraphs 54 and 55. From these counties certain industrial areas

were excluded at our suggestion on the ground that they might be the subject of evacuation schemes or that they were not safe enough for the reception of refugees.

Overcrowding is a serious problem in the North of England and still more serious in Scotland; and it will be a matter of some difficulty to find enough accommodation in Scotland for an evacuation on a substantial scale from the larger cities.

The maps given in Appendix C show how the country might be divided up to provide accommodation for one-third of the population from certain specified industrial centres.

57. As indicated in paragraph 35, we have reached the conclusion, on an examination of the information supplied by the Ministry of Health and the Department of Health for Scotland, that the problem of accommodation provides the limiting factor to the scale on which facilities for evacuation can be provided. It is reasonably clear that in London, and probably in other centres, transport facilities can be provided to meet the needs of any orderly scheme of evacuation, but there is a definite limit on the extent to which billets can be found.

58. We should have liked to recommend that billeting, in any evacuation scheme, should be on the slum clearance standard, but we are satisfied that this would not provide sufficient accommodation, especially in the North of England and in Scotland. It will accordingly be necessary to make preparations on the basis that private houses in the safer areas may have to be filled up to the standard laid down in the Housing Acts, 1935; and in Scotland even that low standard may have to be exceeded.

59. We recommend that, as a first step in the detailed examination of the evacuation problem, local authorities should be directed to make returns to the Home Office of the billeting accommodation available in relatively safe areas on the two standards given in paragraphs 54 and 55.

60. It will be necessary to give the authorities the power in time of war to requisition accommodation for the billeting of refugees; and we need hardly say that any compulsory billeting would have to be enforced without regard to class or other distinctions. If the reception of refugees were worked out on a purely voluntary basis those receiving them would expect to be allowed to impose conditions regarding the type of refugee which they would accept and the circumstances and length of time for which they would take them. Moreover, it would be a matter of the greatest difficulty to keep a register up to date, and when the emergency arose people might change their minds and refuse to carry out their agreement. It appears to us to be quite impracticable to organise the reception of vast masses of persons on so uncertain a basis.

61. At the same time, it would be unfortunate if the very real advantage of voluntary arrangements were to be lost. In the particular case of school children, there would be great practical advantages in securing, so far as possible, their reception in households which had expressed a willingness to receive them. The evidence we have had encourages us to believe that accommodation for the full number of school children might be found on this basis. Householders volunteering to receive school children would, of course, be expected to receive them to the full limit of their capacity but they would have the assurance that they would not also be required to receive adults. In setting apart accommodation for school children a substantial margin will have to be allowed in respect of the probable addition to the normal population of the receiving areas of persons seeking refuge with friends and relatives.

62. It does not appear to be practicable to rely at the outset to any large extent on the use of camps for the permanent accommodation of evacuated persons. The capacity of existing camps of a permanent or semi-permanent character is very limited, and temporary camps (apart from the time occupied in their erection) involve questions of feeding, water supply, and sanitation which militate against their use on any extensive scale.

At the same time, full use would no doubt be made of existing camps and of any that may be erected in the future for peace-time purposes; and it might be necessary in certain districts to erect and use hutments at a later stage in schemes of evacuation to relieve any severe pressure on accommodation.

63. No matter how well a large-scale evacuation may be organised, considerable unevenness in the distribution of refugees in the available accommodation is inevitable; and in the North of England and in Scotland the overcrowding in all areas is already so serious that an influx of refugees into the safer parts may well create conditions which are only tolerable for a short period. We envisage, however, the possibility of a second stage in evacuation plans, when refugees who had been taken quickly to areas conveniently situated for the immediate evacuation of danger zones would be distributed over more distant areas where more accommodation was available.

Food.

64. The report of the Food (Defence Plans) Department for the year 1937 outlines the general plans in contemplation for the supply, control and distribution of food-stuffs in time of war.

65. Arrangements have been made for the setting-up of local food control committees within the area of each local authority and it is intended that each committee should select a local food executive officer as its chief official.

66. The local food control committees will be responsible for

- (a) the registration of all consumers in their areas;
- (b) the licensing and registration of retail traders in essential food-stuffs; and
- (c) the issue of rationing documents to consumers in their areas, if it were decided to ration consumers.

67. We discussed with the Director of the Food (Defence Plans) Department of the Board of Trade the steps which would have to be taken to provide for the feeding of persons transferred from industrial areas under schemes of evacuation, and we are satisfied that, provided that those responsible for working out the arrangements for the supply of food in time of war are given the necessary information and the time in which to complete their plans, there are no insuperable obstacles, from the point of view of the supply of food and of feeding, to schemes of evacuation on the scale which we have in mind. The detailed arrangements necessary represent a great deal of work which will have to be undertaken without delay, when the general framework of the evacuation schemes for the country at large has been settled.

68. It would be necessary to issue food for the first few days to the refugees as rations since it would take some little time for the transferred population to be brought within the rationing arrangements in the neighbourhood to which they were taken. The aim would, however, be to encourage refugees to settle down in their new surroundings with a minimum of delay and to link up with a local retailer. It was considered that if arrangements were made to cope with the situation during the first few days of the transference, the food trade could deal with the situation at all later stages.

69. When detailed plans are being worked out we presume that those responsible will bear in mind that private householders providing accommodation for refugees could not be compelled to provide services, such as cooking. In many cases services of this kind, or at all events facilities, would no doubt be provided by voluntary arrangements; but large-scale plans for communal feeding will have to be included in the scheme.

General Welfare.

70. As soon as the schemes of evacuation have been worked out on a quantitative basis it will be necessary to proceed to make careful plans for safeguarding the health and general welfare of the refugees.

71. Our preliminary enquiries satisfy us that in the country districts immediately round London, there would be no serious objection so far as water supplies and sewerage are concerned

to doubling the present population. There may be rural districts elsewhere where a shortage of water or inadequate sanitary arrangements will make it necessary to limit the number of refugees below the figure which they could otherwise absorb.

72. The Health Services in the reception areas will have to be strengthened to deal with the needs of the augmented population.

73. The arrangements may not serve at the outset to provide more than the bare essentials of existence. But these should never be lacking, albeit on a somewhat meagre scale, and persons who have been moved from places of danger to an area of comparative safety are not likely to be exigent. Nevertheless, it will obviously be of the greatest importance to take all practicable steps to maintain the morale of the population in the reception areas, and it will be necessary to make a special study of ways and means by which this can be done. There may here and there be considerable friction, especially at first, between the inhabitants of these areas and the incomers who are billeted upon them, and who will find themselves in unfamiliar surroundings with a minimum of the necessities of life and very little with which to occupy their time. Such a situation will be fruitful of trouble unless special steps are taken to counteract the consequences of boredom and discontent. At a later stage conditions more nearly approximating to normal life may be attained, especially if, as may be anticipated, a large proportion of the refugees show a spirit of helpful co-operation.

74. In the steps to be taken for the welfare of refugees, there will be great scope for voluntary service, and we are confident that this call will not go unanswered.

Evacuated Areas.

75. Large-scale movements of the civil population at the outset of the war will take the form of evacuation, as defined in paragraph 23, but thereafter a dispersal of the population within the urban area from which evacuation has taken place may provide a further means of alleviating the situation either by adjusting inequalities in the distribution of the population after evacuation or by enabling persons whose continued presence in the area for national purposes is essential to find greater safety through dispersal. This would no doubt have to be arranged by a system of compulsory billeting rather similar to that contemplated in the reception areas.

76. We do not think it would be practicable to carry the principle of dispersing the population to the point of evacuating essential personnel and making plans to transport them back daily in order that they might carry on their work. The idea may have some limited application in certain areas; but as a general rule we believe that it would entail too great a strain on transport facilities and would not prove to be practicable.

CHAPTER III.

SCHOOL CHILDREN.

Introduction.

77. In our examination of the evacuation problem, we have devoted special attention to the manner in which children in vulnerable areas should be dealt with.

78. In January last, the Board of Education and the Scottish Education Department, with the concurrence of the Home Office, issued circulars to local education authorities on the protection of school children in time of air attack. The question whether schools should remain open in time of war was left to the discretion of local education authorities; but an indication was given that in areas where the risk of air attack was great the preferable course was to close the schools during the whole period for which raids might be expected.

On the subject of the evacuation of school children from dangerous areas, the circulars went on to say:—

“ In those areas which are especially exposed to danger the ideal solution would be to evacuate the children—not all of whom will be of school age—to safer districts, preferably in the country, where they could be dispersed in private houses or public buildings or possibly in small camps. The difficulties of any such scheme are obvious, but they should not prevent its careful consideration. Details would have to be worked out beforehand (and the consent of the parents obtained) as part of the general scheme of Air Raid Precautions for the district, and in co-operation with the authorities for the districts to which the children would be transferred. The Home Office would be prepared to advise authorities, so far as possible, in the preparation of schemes for the purpose.”

Local Education Authorities.

79. The Air Raid Precautions Act, 1937, was framed on the basis that the initiative for schemes of evacuation rests with the Government, and the responsibility of local authorities is confined to making arrangements pursuant to any directions given by the Home Secretary. Local education authorities will, therefore, look to the Government for a definite lead before proceeding with the preparation of detailed plans for removing children from vulnerable areas.

80. Following the issue of the circulars, a number of local education authorities have decided to close their schools on the outbreak of war and have expressed views in favour of the evacuation of school children from vulnerable areas.

81. Thus the London County Council, by a resolution passed on the 10th May last, agreed:—

“(a) that the Council approves in principle the policy of a general closure of all its schools in London for a limited period on advice being tendered by the competent authorities that air raids are to be expected, and that the question of re-opening schools in any or all parts of London be considered at short intervals in the light of experience; and that the managers of non-provided schools and the governors of aided schools and institutions be advised to take similar action;

(b) that, in the opinion of the Council, any scheme of evacuation of the child population should be dealt with as an integral part of the scheme of transfer of the civil population; and that the Council expresses its willingness to co-operate with H.M. Government and the Metropolitan Borough Councils in schemes of evacuation;

(c) that the Council agrees in principle that, in case of emergency, children in its residential schools deemed to be exposed to danger shall be transferred to the Council's residential schools deemed to be less exposed and the Council's training college students dispersed.”

Case for Separate Evacuation of Children.

82. We received a substantial volume of evidence in support of the view that plans should be prepared for the evacuation of children of school age from vulnerable areas to places of greater safety. The London County Council were good enough to outline for us a scheme under which 500,000 school children might be removed from the County of London, under the care of their teachers, and billeted in the country districts surrounding London. The National Union of Teachers, the Educational Institute of Scotland and representatives of the Secondary School Teachers Associations assured us that the Government could count on the full co-operation of school teachers in the working out and execution of any scheme for evacuating school children, and the Secretary of the Association of Education Committees gave us a similar assurance on behalf of the local education authorities.

83. There are substantial advantages in favour of a detailed plan for the transfer of school children from danger zones in time of war. If men have to remain in these areas because they are engaged in work of national importance, their wives may wish to stay with them and they will be performing the very necessary task of keeping the home of the menfolk and feeding them. Very young children can hardly be parted from their mothers.

84. The children of school age, on the other hand, are a liability and not an asset from the standpoint of war-time efficiency. There is every reason for removing them from the physical dangers and nervous strain of repeated aerial bombardment. Instances were quoted to us of children in London during the last war who suffered serious and permanent injury, because of the shock to the nervous system of repeated air raids. While no one can gauge exactly the conditions that will prevail in any future war, we must assume that they will be infinitely worse than in London in the last war.

85. The removal and billeting of school children would probably present fewer difficulties, as a problem of organisation, than any scheme covering all the members of the community who could be spared. As we have indicated above, any plans for the transference of masses of the population will have to be very general in character, because it is impossible to define closely the individuals who will participate in the arrangements made. With school children, on the other hand, the school can be taken as the unit and plans prepared on the basis that the numbers in attendance at any given school, or a proportion thereof, will have to be removed. This gives a precise basis for plans which is lacking in the case of adults. Further, the numbers involved, though very large, are more manageable than the total number of persons who could be spared from any area; and the collection, transport, reception, accommodation and welfare arrangements are correspondingly more easy to arrange. As regards billeting arrangements, the social difficulties which may arise in the receiving areas are relatively small in the case of children. A householder in the country will be much more ready to receive some children into his house than a number of adults.

Attitude of Parents.

86. Those who appeared before us were all agreed that any scheme for the evacuation of school children must be entirely voluntary in character, that is to say the decision whether a child remains at home or is evacuated with other school children must rest with its parents. We are in complete agreement with this view. Whatever the attractions and practicability of a scheme for the transference of school children from dangerous zones, the probable attitude of the parent is, therefore, a most important factor in the situation.

87. We had conflicting views on the attitude which parents were likely to adopt. It was represented forcibly to us by some witnesses that in times of severe stress many parents would refuse to be parted from their children, and that accordingly evacuation arrangements should be made on a family basis. It was considered that mothers with children of school age might be

doubtful whether their children would be properly cared for under any evacuation scheme and would take the line that no part of the country was safe from attack. It was also argued that they would be deterred from parting with their children because of a fear that in war news might not be forthcoming of the safety and well-being of their children. It was also thought that mothers, with children below or above school age as well as children of school age, might be unwilling to acquiesce in arrangements which treated the school children differently from the others.

88. Some witnesses were of opinion that the first reaction of parents, especially if the question were put to them in a casual way in time of peace, would be to refuse to contemplate separation from their children, but that if the dangers to which their children would be exposed, and a detailed scheme for their removal to homes in safer areas, were placed before them, they would probably be willing to agree to part with their children. The arrangement would in effect amount to a transference of the school, with the scholars, a proportion of the teaching and welfare organisation, medical services, books and other equipment, and viewed in this light should not be unattractive to parents.

89. We have given much anxious consideration to this question, and in the short time at our disposal have endeavoured to inform ourselves of opinion on the subject. Among others, we have consulted representatives of the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organisations, the Women's Co-operative Guild, the National Council of Women, the London and National Society for Women's Service, the Women's Conservative Organisation, the Women's Liberal Federation, and the National Federation of Women's Institutes: also the Dowager Marchioness of Reading on behalf of the recently formed organisation known as Women's Voluntary Services.

Recommendations.

90. It is our considered opinion that as a matter of organisation a detailed plan for the evacuation of school children, coupled with more general arrangements for the evacuation of other non-essential members of the community, offers a greater probability of success than general arrangements for the evacuation of the population on a family basis. While we do not wish to underestimate the difficulties of bringing a proportion—it may be a substantial proportion—of parents round to the view that it is in the best interests of their children of school age that they should be evacuated separately, we believe that if detailed plans were prepared and properly explained the great majority of parents would allow their children to go.

91. We accordingly recommend that plans should be prepared in complete detail for the transfer of children of school age in time of war from vulnerable areas to places of greater safety. The school should be treated as the unit, and details should be worked out through the local education authorities with the co-operation of the teachers. It would have to be understood that in any evacuation plans the scheme relating to school children had first claim on transport and reception facilities. As indicated in paragraph 61, the children would be accommodated as far as possible in houses where they were assured of a friendly reception and which were conveniently situated with regard to the educational facilities available in the reception areas.

92. So far as practicable, the education of the children should be continued in their new surroundings, possibly by the use of a shift system in existing schools and by classes in halls and other improvised accommodation.

93. When arrangements in any area are sufficiently advanced for a connected account of them to be given, we think that meetings should be held at the schools when a suitable person can explain the proposals to the parents. We believe that these meetings would serve a useful purpose in removing doubts in the minds of parents and in enabling an estimate to be made of the proportion of parents who would allow their children to be evacuated if war came.

94. If either generally or in particular areas there were no substantial response in favour of plans for the separate removal of school children, the idea might have to be dropped. Any work which had been done would not, however, be wasted since the arrangements so far as not used for school children would be equally appropriate—apart of course from the rôle assigned to education authorities and school teachers—to other classes of the population.

95. If our proposals for school children commend themselves to the Government, it might be well to arrange for a scheme to be prepared for a sample area, before directions are given to local authorities throughout the country to proceed in the matter. London would seem to be a very suitable area for this test. The London County Council have already had the matter under consideration; and a scheme worked out for a portion of the London area by the London County Council and the neighbouring local education authorities would prove of great value to other local authorities and would throw up points of difficulty which could be discussed, and if possible settled, before general directions were issued to the local authorities in other vulnerable areas.

96. We considered how far arrangements similar to those proposed for school children are practicable in the case of children under school age, the infirm and the aged. The position of the sick and of expectant mothers is being dealt with by the Advisory Committee appointed by the Home Secretary on London Casualty Organisation. We believe that the balance of advantage in the case of very young children is not to attempt to separate them from their mothers, but to deal with them under any general arrangements made for the transference from dangerous areas of those who can be spared. The infirm and the aged should similarly be dealt with under any general scheme.

CHAPTER IV.

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE.

Administration.

97. The Home Secretary is responsible for giving general directions regarding schemes for the evacuation of the civilian population from areas exposed to attack.

98. So far as concerns local arrangements, within the framework of general guidance from the Government, the procedure making for the greatest efficiency and despatch is for an existing machine such as the local authority organisation, to be used. This seems to be the arrangement contemplated in the Air Raid Precautions Act, 1937, and the regulations made under that Act.

99. The case of London, however, presents special features. We do not think it would be practicable to add to the existing responsibilities of the 28 metropolitan borough councils and there are strong reasons for treating the Greater London Area for this purpose as one unit. We suggest, therefore, that so far as the evacuation problem is concerned an *ad hoc* organisation should be set up with direct responsibility to the appropriate Department of State. Any such organisation should of course work in close co-ordination with the other branches of the air raid precautions service in the Greater London Area.

100. We desire to emphasise strongly our view that the necessary organisation should be set up without delay, both centrally at the Home Office and locally, to work out plans in peace and to form the nucleus of the staff required in time of war to put these plans into operation.

101. A central controlling authority will be required in each zone in which large movements of population are carried out. A general supervision of this kind will be necessary, since, for example, it may be necessary to slow down the evacuation process, either in the catchment area or at the entraining centres, because of difficulties at the reception end.

102. As indicated above, we consider that, subject to special arrangements in London, local authorities should provide the executive organisation required in the areas from which evacuation will take place and in the reception areas. While there is a vast scope in this work for voluntary service all such assistance must function within the framework of an official machine, on which in the last resort rests the responsibility for planning and executing the schemes in all their details.

103. In the vulnerable areas where refugees must be given directions about routes, times of departure, luggage and so forth, and where transport must be arranged, the responsible authority will find it necessary to designate officers to control the movement of population, with many subordinate officials in charge of arrangements in sub-divisions of the local authority's area.

104. In the reception districts, the billeting of refugees, the keeping of records and the payment of allowances to the owners of billeting accommodation will have to be carried out by persons appointed as paid officials of the responsible authority. There should be a statutory obligation on these officials to carry out the duties imposed upon them. Transport must also be organised in a similar way, subject to any general directions issued by the Traffic Commissioners, and it is to be anticipated that official resources will be supplemented by large numbers of private cars volunteered for the task. Voluntary bodies could probably play a large part in arranging for the communal feeding of refugees, so far as this proves to be necessary, and for general welfare arrangements.

105. If the general direction of schemes within each county comes under a committee of the county council, it might be found desirable to delegate the function of billeting and the general care of the refugees designated for a certain area in the county to the local authority of the detaining centre to which refugees were taken in the first place. There would be an allocation of numbers for the centre and for its surrounding area, and once that number had arrived further refugees would be sent on into other areas.

106. The responsibilities of the police are likely to be so heavy under the conditions we have to contemplate that we think it would be desirable as far as possible to avoid placing any specific responsibility upon them in connection with the organisation of evacuation.

Finance.

107. We do not anticipate that the preparation of schemes of evacuation will involve any substantial expenditure in time of peace. If, however, it should prove to be necessary to put these schemes into operation heavy expenditure would be incurred.

108. In our view the Government should bear the entire cost of the evacuation and maintenance in safer districts of school children removed from vulnerable areas.

109. In the case of any large-scale evacuation covering other members of the community, the cost of transport and free rations at the outset of the transference and the first charge for accommodation, feeding and general welfare arrangements should fall upon the Government.

110. When evacuation has been completed and conditions have become stabilised, we consider that the authorities should take steps to ascertain the persons who can afford to contribute wholly or partly to their maintenance, and that they should require from such persons a contribution towards the general expenses which the Government are incurring. A man in receipt of full pay or a soldier in receipt of a separation allowance could not expect to be in pocket by reason of the fact that his dependent relations had been evacuated to a safer place.

111. Payments would have to be made in respect of accommodation requisitioned as billets and of any rations supplied by private persons. We have not gone into the question of appropriate rates. There are scales in the Army Act for the billeting of troops and we were informed that the London County Council pay 10s. 6d. a week for children boarded out.

CONCLUSIONS.

112. The more important conclusions at which the Committee has arrived and the main recommendations which it has to make may be summarised as follows:—

(1) The whole issue in any future war may well turn on the manner in which the problem of evacuation from densely populated industrial areas is handled (paragraph 25).

(2) Plans for evacuation are no substitute for measures of active and passive defence, designed to enable production to be maintained in time of war in the industrial areas of this country (paragraph 17).

(3) The necessity for some measure of evacuation of non-essential persons from the principal industrial areas must be faced, both on grounds of humanity and to relieve the situation in congested industrial areas (paragraph 26). In any event there would be an exodus, on a scale which cannot accurately be foreseen, from any area which was subjected to repeated air attack (paragraph 11).

(4) The country will not be fully prepared for attack from a powerful foe until the necessary organisation has been set up and schemes of evacuation worked out (paragraph 29).

(5) Schemes must be on a basis of voluntary evacuation (paragraph 12). Compulsory wholesale evacuation would only arise in limited areas liable to intensive bombardment or for other reasons, e.g. flooding, rendered uninhabitable (paragraph 28).

(6) The plans to be drawn up should be on broad lines, designed to make the fullest practical use of the facilities available. Within the limits of a plan, evacuation could then be carried out in time of emergency to whatever extent was decided upon by the authorities (paragraph 36).

(7) There appear to be adequate transport facilities, certainly in the London area, for a scheme of evacuation on any practicable scale. The main line railways would be used, fed by underground railways and buses (paragraphs 41 and 44).

(8) In the areas used for the reception of refugees, they should be housed in private dwellings under a scheme of billeting for which compulsory powers would have to be taken, though voluntary arrangements should be relied upon as much as possible especially in the case of school children (paragraphs 60 and 61).

(9) Local authorities should be directed to make a survey of billeting accommodation available in suitable areas; and areas should be allotted for the reception of refugees from

each of the main industrial centres (paragraph 59). The areas suggested after a preliminary survey are shown on maps appended to the Report.

(10) No serious difficulty is anticipated in the feeding of refugees provided that adequate arrangements are made in advance (paragraph 67).

(11) Welfare services will be required in the reception areas and here there is a great scope for voluntary service (paragraph 74).

(12) In a vulnerable area which has been partially evacuated it may be practicable to redistribute the remaining population more evenly in order to disperse them and lessen the risk (paragraph 75).

(13) If, when the initial stage of evacuation is completed, it is found to have resulted in intolerable conditions of congestion in the receiving areas, a further transference from those areas to more remote districts should be arranged (paragraph 63).

(14) In the expectation that there will eventually be a substantial measure of support for the idea, plans should be prepared in complete detail for the transference of children of school age, school by school, in time of war from vulnerable areas to places of greater safety (paragraph 91).

(15) No child should be removed without the consent of its parents and steps should be taken to inform parents in time of peace of the detailed plans proposed and to ascertain their reactions (paragraphs 86 and 93).

(16) Before schemes are prepared throughout the country for school children, there would be advantage in preparing a plan in fairly complete detail for a portion of the London area, as a sample scheme (paragraph 95).

(17) Steps should be taken without delay to set up the necessary central and local organisation for working out schemes of evacuation (paragraph 100).

(18) The Government should bear the whole cost of schemes for the evacuation of school children (paragraph 108).

(19) In the case of plans covering other members of the community the first charges should be upon the Government, but those who are evacuated would be expected to make a contribution towards their maintenance (paragraphs 109 and 110).

113. We are fully satisfied that a scheme on the lines indicated in this Report is entirely practicable. It could, we believe, be organised for the whole country in the course of a few months.

If the need for it were to arise before it had been completed emergency arrangements on the same lines could, we think, be improvised in a very short time.

114. Though the operation of such a scheme might be subject to innumerable hitches and interruptions it would, we are convinced, enable the Government to keep the situation under control whatever might betide. Thus the chief temptation to a potential enemy to stake everything on the hazard of a knock-out blow would be removed.

115. We would emphasise, however, that no scheme of this kind can be considered complete until it is understood by the people and has secured the backing of the overwhelming mass of public opinion. There must therefore be a process of education of the public. This will begin while the details of the scheme are being elaborated. The instructions to the various authorities and voluntary bodies that will be concerned in the preparation of the detailed plan will be public and should be carefully prepared with this in view. The final stage in the education process will be reached after the completion of the scheme. Literature should then be widely disseminated explaining the problem and the measures prepared to deal with it. We attach very great importance to this. The resources of the Press and the British Broadcasting Corporation will no doubt be made fully available and should be freely used. The same agencies could be of the greatest service in the operation of the scheme if unhappily the occasion should ever arise.

116. In conclusion we wish to express our acknowledgments to our Secretary, Mr. A. Johnston of the Home Office. He has left nothing undone which could conduce to the expeditious handling of the task entrusted to us and we are greatly indebted to him.

We have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servants,

JOHN ANDERSON (*Chairman*).

GEORGE DOLAND.

L. HADEN GUEST.

PERCY C. HARRIS.

A. JOHNSTON (*Secretary*).

26th July, 1938.

APPENDIX A

See paragraph 2].

EVIDENCE

(1) *Witnesses examined by the Committee.*

Mr. V. M. Barrington-Ward, D.S.O., Chairman of the Railway Companies' Technical A.R.P. Committee.

Mrs. B. A. Bayfield, on behalf of the Women's Liberal Federation.

Mr. S. L. Besso, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Labour.

Mr. J. W. H. Brown, on behalf of the National Union of Teachers.

Mrs. M. F. Cant, on behalf of the Women's Liberal Federation.

Miss L. Charlesworth, on behalf of the London and National Society for Women's Service.

Lady Denman, D.B.E., on behalf of the National Federation of Women's Institutes.

Mrs. N. de Selincourt, Women's Voluntary Services.

Mr. W. S. Douglas, C.B., Secretary, Department of Health for Scotland.

Mr. G. D. Dunkerley, on behalf of the Association of Assistant Masters.

Mr. C. W. G. Eady, C.B., C.M.G., Deputy Under Secretary of State, Home Office.

Lady Emmott, on behalf of the National Council of Women of Great Britain.

Sir Henry L. French, K.B.E., C.B., Director, Food (Defence Plans) Department, Board of Trade.

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game, G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.

Sir George H. Gater, C.M.G., D.S.O., Clerk of the London County Council.

Wing Commander R. V. Goddard, Air Ministry.

Miss B. Anne Godwin, on behalf of the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organisations.

Mrs. E. J. Gooch, on behalf of the National Federation of Women's Institutes.

Mr. H. B. Guthrie, on behalf of the Educational Institute of Scotland.

Mrs. Norah Haldane, on behalf of the National Federation of Women's Institutes.

Miss K. M. Halpin, on behalf of the London and National Society for Women's Service.

Mr. W. W. Hatton, Ministry of Labour.

Mr. T. Henderson, on behalf of the Educational Institute of Scotland.

Lady Horsley, on behalf of the Women's Liberal Federation.

Mr. F. R. Hurlstone-Jones, on behalf of the Association of Head Masters.

Mr. G. A. N. Lowndes, Assistant Education Officer of the London County Council.

Mr. C. Grant McKenzie, on behalf of the Labour Party.

Sir Frederick Mander, on behalf of the National Union of Teachers.

The Right Honourable Herbert Morrison, M.P., on behalf of the London County Council.

Mr. W. S. Murrie, Department of Health for Scotland.

Mr. P. J. Noel-Baker, M.P., on behalf of the Labour Party.

Mrs. E. V. Parker, on behalf of the National Union of Teachers.

Mrs. M. Pavitt, on behalf of the Women's Co-operative Guild.
 Mr. Frank Pick, Vice-Chairman, London Passenger Transport Board.
 Mr. T. G. Randall, London County Council.
 Lady Reading, Chairman, Women's Voluntary Services.
 Mr. E. M. Rich, Education Officer of the London County Council.
 Mr. Charles Robertson, on behalf of the London County Council.
 Mrs. Norah Runge, O.B.E., on behalf of the Women's Conservative Organisation.
 Mr. E. C. H. Salmon, Deputy Clerk of the London County Council.
 Sir Percival Sharp, Secretary of the Association of Education Committees.
 Miss Hirst Simpson, on behalf of the National Federation of Women's Institutes.
 Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. D. Stevens, C.B.E., D.L., Chief Constable of Bedfordshire.
 Miss Phillippa Strachey, on behalf of the London and National Society for Women's Service.
 Miss Mary E. Sutherland, on behalf of the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organisations.
 Mr. G. S. Szlumper, C.B.E., T.D., General Manager, Southern Railway.
 Miss E. M. Tanner, on behalf of the Association of Head Mistresses.
 Wing Commander P. Warburton, M.B.E., Assistant Secretary, Air Raid Precautions Department, Home Office.
 Colonel T. R. P. Warren, C.B.E., Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire.
 Sir Harold Webbe, C.B.E., on behalf of the London County Council.
 Sir Ralph L. Wedgwood, C.B., C.M.G., Chief General Manager, London and North Eastern Railway.
 Mrs. E. Williams, on behalf of the Women's Co-operative Guild.
 Mrs. U. Gordon Wilson, on behalf of the Association of Assistant Mistresses.
 Mr. J. Wishart, on behalf of the Educational Institute of Scotland.
 Mr. Humbert Wolfe, C.B., C.B.E., Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour.
 Mrs. W. Worsdell, on behalf of the Women's Conservative Organisation.
 Mr. J. C. Wrigley, Director and Principal Assistant Secretary of the Housing and Town Planning Division, Ministry of Health.

(2) Departments and Associations which submitted evidence.

Air Ministry.
 A.R.P. Committee of Private Members supporting the National Government.
 Association of Assistant Masters.
 Association of Assistant Mistresses.
 Association of Education Committees.
 Association of Head Masters.
 Association of Head Mistresses.
 Board of Trade.
 Department of Health for Scotland.
 Educational Institute of Scotland.
 General Managers' Conference of the Main Line Railway Companies.

Home Office.

Labour Party.

London and National Society for Women's Service.

London County Council.

London Passenger Transport Board.

Ministry of Health.

Ministry of Labour.

National Council of Women of Great Britain.

National Federation of Women's Institutes.

National Union of Teachers.

Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organisations.

Women's Conservative Organisation.

Women's Co-operative Guild.

Women's Liberal Federation.

Women's Voluntary Services.

APPENDIX B
ACCOMMODATION AVAILABLE FOR BILLETING
(i) *England and Wales.*

Name of County. (1)	Population of excluded districts. (2)	Population of remainder of County. (3)	No. of rooms in remainder of County. (4)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of County.		Regional population of excluded districts. (7)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of region.	
				On standard of 1 person to 1 room (5)	On standard of 5 persons to 4 rooms (6)		On standard of 1 person to 1 room. (8)	On standard of 5 persons to 4 rooms. (9)
Northumberland ...	530,644	199,128	224,518	25,390	81,519	1,304,528	109,882	327,440
Durham ...	729,204	723,487	637,063	—	72,842			
Cumberland ...	44,680	209,260	264,226	54,966	121,022			
Westmorland ...	—	60,598	90,124	29,526	52,057			
Yorkshire (W. Rdg.)	2,228,229	1,097,275	1,300,280	203,005	528,075	2,779,036	359,095	808,811
Yorkshire (E. Rdg.)	311,319	145,390	216,159	70,769	124,809			
Yorkshire (N. Rdg.)	239,488	197,102	282,423	85,321	155,927			
Lancashire ...	3,606,527	1,203,283	1,557,657	354,374	743,788			
Cheshire ...	618,047	430,321	602,485	172,164	322,785	1,629,046	395,847	756,142
Staffordshire ...	1,010,999	381,804	534,066	152,262	285,778			
Shropshire ...	—	233,212	304,633	71,421	147,579			
Somerset ...	3,537	446,230	674,957	228,727	397,466			
Dorset ...	39,589	181,147	276,440	95,293	164,403	233,905	776,234	1,323,417
Devon ...	190,779	484,029	759,751	275,722	465,660			
Cornwall ...	—	301,093	477,585	176,492	295,888			

APPENDIX B—*cont.*

Name of County. (1)	Population of excluded districts. (2)	Population of remainder of County. (3)	No. of rooms in remainder of County. (4)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of County.		Regional population of excluded districts. (7)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of region.	
				On standard of 1 person to 1 room. (5)	On standard of 5 persons to 4 rooms (6)		On standard of 1 person to 1 room. (8)	On standard of 5 persons to 4 rooms. (9)
Herefordshire	22,533	83,427	123,119	39,692	70,472	1,793,213	362,616	688,561
Worcester	125,847	277,611	354,382	76,771	165,366			
Warwick	1,233,273	242,203	336,621	94,418	178,573			
Gloucester	411,560	337,925	489,660	151,735	274,150			
Rutland	—	16,910	26,720	9,810	16,490	1,206,874	456,432	909,696
Leicester	230,869	294,289	405,337	111,048	212,382			
Lincoln	216,144	377,513	543,785	166,272	302,218			
Nottingham	389,404	303,264	382,180	78,916	174,461			
Derby	370,457	364,652	455,038	90,386	204,145	297,094	439,496	756,159
Norfolk	173,793	308,959	476,671	167,712	286,880			
Suffolk (E. & W.)	123,301	258,903	400,122	141,219	241,249			
Ely, Isle of...	—	75,371	106,548	31,177	57,814			
Cambridge	—	129,005	199,543	70,538	120,424	49,792		
Huntingdon	—	54,919	83,769	28,850	49,792			

Essex ...	1,365,745	321,329	489,463	168,134	290,500			
Kent ...	682,428	445,820	666,197	220,377	386,926			
Sussex (E. & W.) ...	—	699,260	1,079,498	380,238	650,112			
Surrey ...	743,611	358,187	593,185	234,998	383,294			
Hampshire ...	516,639	389,246	601,048	211,802	362,064			
Hertfordshire ...	131,149	246,765	384,401	137,636	233,736			
Wiltshire ...	61,276	221,679	318,694	97,015	176,688	9,635,620	1,877,313	3,234,240
Northampton and Peterborough ...	131,214	218,841	318,452	99,611	179,224			
Bedfordshire ...	108,961	102,161	153,980	51,819	90,314			
Berkshire ...	93,080	198,770	297,066	98,296	172,562			
Buckingham ...	31,772	225,724	341,059	115,335	200,600			
Oxford ...	69,181	122,622	184,674	62,052	108,220			
London ...	4,122,639	—	—	—	—			
Middlesex ...	1,577,925	—	—	—	—			
Anglesey ...	—	47,470	72,675	25,205	43,374			
Caernarvon ...	—	112,305	177,226	64,921	109,227			
Denbigh ...	—	149,588	190,543	40,955	88,581		208,513	386,876
Flint ...	—	107,827	141,714	33,887	69,315			
Merioneth ...	—	40,702	63,659	22,957	38,872			
Montgomery ...	—	47,088	67,676	20,588	37,507			
Brecknock ...	—	55,244	73,848	18,604	37,066			
Carmarthen ...	37,679	138,009	177,446	39,437	83,798			
Cardigan ...	—	52,405	87,269	34,864	56,681			
Glamorgan ...	535,723	656,376	786,049	129,673	326,185	659,200	338,069	763,666
Monmouth ...	85,798	338,903	399,734	60,831	160,764			
Pembroke ...	—	82,685	144,388	31,703	60,300			
Radnor ...	—	40,702	63,659	22,957	38,872			

(2) Scotland

Name of County. (1)	Population of excluded districts. (2)	Population of remainder of County. (3)	No. of rooms in remainder of County. (4)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of County.		Regional population of excluded districts. (7)	No. of additional persons for whom accommodation is available in remainder of region.	
				On standard of 1 person to 1 room. (5)	On statutory over- crowding standard. (6)		On standard of 1 person to 1 room. (8)	On statutory over- crowding standard. (9)
City of Edinburgh...	388,517	29,236	31,290	2,054	29,536	484,718	5,914	193,280
Midlothian ...	16,806	68,442	51,246	—	18,448			
East Lothian ...	—	45,387	41,859	—	25,298			
West Lothian ...	18,008	61,556	35,646	—	—			
Stirlingshire ...	61,387	98,867	73,570	—	28,022			
Clackmannan ...	—	31,376	24,256	—	10,519			
Berwickshire ...	—	26,357	28,534	2,177	22,883			
Roxburghshire ...	—	44,678	45,584	906	34,206			
Selkirkshire ...	—	22,170	20,189	—	12,339			
Peeblesshire ...	—	14,679	15,456	777	12,029			
City of Glasgow ...	978,942	74,316	79,573	5,257	75,188	1,741,844	26,709	386,732
Lanarkshire ...	332,945	152,587	99,815	—	13,771			
Renfrewshire ...	249,995	27,961	26,607	—	16,091			
Dunbartonshire ...	86,237	56,428	46,416	—	22,698			
Ayrshire ...	93,725	184,451	146,416	—	57,846			
Dumfriesshire ...	—	77,886	77,629	—	59,342			
Kirkcudbrightshire ...	—	29,830	36,045	6,215	34,229			
Wigtownshire ...	—	28,764	31,922	3,158	29,270			
Argyll ...	—	58,830	67,077	8,247	57,673			
Bute ...	—	17,472	21,304	3,832	20,624			

APPENDIX C


MAP OF BILLETING ACCOMMODATION (ENGLAND AND WALES)

See paragraph 56.]




The above map shows how one-third of the population of the under-mentioned industrial centres might be evacuated to the neighbouring areas and housed *on the slum clearance standard* (1 person to 1 room).

- 1,900,200 persons from London and Middlesex to be evacuated to the area shaded
- 130,300 persons from Newcastle and Gateshead to be evacuated to the area shaded
- 515,700 persons from Leeds, Bradford, Sheffield and Hull to be evacuated to the area shaded
- 611,400 persons from Liverpool, Bootle, Manchester and Salford to be evacuated to the area shaded
- 320,700 persons from Birmingham to be evacuated to the area shaded



The area left white would be available for further requirements. The dotted areas represent some of the places which might be evacuated or be considered unsuitable for receiving refugees.

MAP OF BILLETING ACCOMMODATION (SCOTLAND)




The above map shows how one-third of the population of the more densely populated parts of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee might be evacuated to neighbouring areas, and housed *on the statutory overcrowding standard*.


130,000 persons from Edinburgh to be evacuated to the area shaded



326,000 persons from Glasgow to be evacuated to the area shaded



57,000 persons from Dundee to be evacuated to the area shaded



The area left white would be available for further requirements. The dotted areas represent some of the places which might be evacuated or be considered unsuitable for receiving refugees.

